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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDUR -Pre-trial Examination of a Corporate
Employee-A corporate party to an action may be examined as
an adversary prior to trial through a subordinate employee who
is neither an officer of the corporation nor an agent with general
authority to act for the corporation. Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte
Airline Railway Co. (S.C. 1968).
Plaintiff, as administrator, commenced actions for wrongful
death and under the survival act for the benefit of the estate of
Charles E. Lewis, who allegedly was killed after being struck
by a train of the defendant. The plaintiff served upon the
defendant and Walter T. Morris, the engineer of the train, a
notice of motion and affidavit seeking an order requiring the
defendant corporation to appear by and through its engineer
before the Master in Equity for Greenville County for exami-
nation upon the various facts and circumstances of the accident.
The plaintiff asserted that these facts were essential to the
preparation of his case and that the engineer was the sole person
having knowledge of the facts. Over the defendant's objection,
the circuit court issued an order directing that the defendant
be examined by and through the engineer. On appeal the South
Carolina Supreme Court, held, order affirmed. Under section
26-503 of the South Carolina Code1 a corporate party to an
action may be examined before trial through a subordinate em-
ployee who is neither an officer nor an agent of the corporation.
Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Railyway Go., 159 S.E.2d 243
(S.C. 1968).
Within the provisions of section 26-503 of the code, there is
no express language providing for the examination of a corpora-
tion as an adversary before trial. However, the supreme court
as early as 1929 recognized that the word "party" as it appeared
1. S. C. CODE ANN. § 26-503 provides:
The examination of an adverse party, instead of being had at trial as
provided in § 26-510, may be had at any time before trial, at the option
of the party claiming it, before a judge of the court, on a previous
notice of at least five days to the party to be examined and any other
adverse party, unless, for good cause shown, the judge order otherwise.
But the party to be examined shall not be compelled to attend in any
other county than that of his residence, unless, it be upon the order of a
judge of the court granted after four days' notice and upon good and
sufficient cause being shown therefor.
1
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in this statute was broad enough to encompass a corporation.
2
When the word "person" or "party" is used in a statute, the court
found that as a general rule it includes a corporation "unless
the intention to exclude such artificial persons is plainly ob-
ViOUS."
3
Our statute does not prescribe through whom a corporation
may be questioned, but the practice of the supreme court has
been to allow examination through officerS)4 agents5 and em-
ployees.0 Lewis presented the first challenge to the examination
of a corporate employee under section 26-503. Indeed, the court
admitted that it could find no case law in any jurisdiction deal-
ing with the precise point involved here: Whether a corporation
can be examined through its employee when the statute of the
state failed to specify the persons through whom the corporation
may be questioned.
The South Carolina statute is silent on this subject, but some
states expressly allow the questioning of a corporate employee.7
For example the Alabama Code explicitly provides that "when
. . . interrogatories are addressed . . . [to] a corporation, the
answers thereto must be made by such officer, agent, or servant
of the corporation as may be cognizant of the facts."3
The plaintiff's notice of motion addressed to the defendants'
attorneys9 alleged that the engineer was the sole person having
knowledge of the facts which the plaintiff sought to ascertain.
Lewis thus presented an excellent opportunity for the court to
limit this examination to those situations in which the employee
is the only person who has possession of the specific information
sought. The court failed to adopt any such limitation.
In discussing prior decisions the court emphasized that these
cases "clearly indicate that a corporate party can be examined
2. United States Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co., 153 S.C. 56, 150
S.E. 347 (1929).
3. Id. at 61, 150 S.E. at 349; see also S. C. CoDE ANN. § 30-203 (1962);
23 AM. Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 240 (1965).
4. Barfield v. Dillon Motor Sales, Inc., 233 S.C. 26, 103 S.E2d 416 (1958).
5. Stepp v. Horton, 227 S.C. 432, 88 S.E2d 258 (1955); Mahaffey v.
Southern Ry., 175 S.C. 198, 178 S.E. 838 (1934).
6. Williamson v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 236 S.C. 101, 113 S.E.2d
345 (1960); Barfield v. Dillon Motor Sales, Inc., 233 S.C. 26, 103 S.E2d
416 (1958).
7. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 480 (1958); N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. § 3101 (McKinney
1963) (employee of a party).
8. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 480 (1958) (emphasis added).
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through a subordinate employee, particularly where that em-
ployee is the sole person having knowledge of the facts sought
to be ascertained .. . ."1O This statement indicates that while
the examination may be limited in certain circumstances at the
judge's direction, it is not restricted to information which is
solely within the employee's knowledge. Indeed, one of the
decisions cited, Barfield v. Dillon Motor Sales, Inc.,"1 allowed
the plaintiff to obtain information from both an officer and a
bookkeeper as to the number of persons employed by the corpora-
tion in order to determine whether the company was subject to
the workmen's compensation laws. The implication is that the
bookkeeper was not the sole person with this information, but
the court still allowed the examination of both persons. How-
ever, the defendant pointed out that the question of whether
the bookkeeper was a proper person to speak for the corporation
was not raised.12
The rationale for not allowing a corporation to be examined
through an employee is that the testimony could be used by
the other parties for any purpose at the trial, and the corpora-
tion should not be bound by the testimony of a person who
may not be loyal to its interests.'" The person through whom
the corporation is questioned should be one who can be ex-
pected to identify himself with the interests of the corporation
rather than those of some other party. At the heart of the de-
fendant's objection was this binding effect upon the corporation
created by the testimony of one who may be disloyal. The de-
fendant had no objection to an examination of Morris by depo-
sition 14 since this would have had the effect of binding only
him as a witness at trial and not the corporation itself.
In allowing the plaintiff to examine the corporation's em-
ployee and to use the information at trial, the court avoided
the issue of to what extent the corporate party may be bound
by the testimony of the engineer since disloyalty was not alleged
in the case. The court, however, implied that if conflict of in-
10. Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Ry., 159 S.E2d 243, 244 (S.C. 1968).
11. 233 S.C. 26, 103 S.E.2d 416 (1958).
12. Brief for Defendant at 9, Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Ry., 159
S.E.2d 243 (S.C. 1968).
13. See, c.g., Rubin v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
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terests on the part of an employee is ever shown, this might
go only to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.'5
The defendant pointed out that the precise issue involved
here has frequently arisen under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and under state statutory counterparts thereto.16
Under Rule 26(d) (2) and Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure pre-trial discovery must be through an officer
or managing agent of a corporation. 1' Other than cases de-
cided under the Federal Rules and state statutory counterparts,
the defendant cited no authority for its contention that the
corporation should not be examined through its employee.
There has been much disagreement in the federal cases as to
whether certain employees are "managing agents." Whether
a particular deponent is a "managing agent" is determined on
an ad hoc basis.' 8 In ascertaining the status of a deponent the
courts have applied certain practical considerations such as:
(1) Whether there was any danger that the proposed deponent's
interests at the time of the taking of the deposition was adverse
or hostile to the party whose managing agent he was alleged to
be; (2) Whether the deponent was invested with general powers
to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with corpo-
rate matters or with operations which led to the alleged injury;
and (3) Whether the prospective deponent could have been ex-
pected to comply with his employee's directive to appear for
pre-trial examination.' 9
Perhaps the leading case on the issue of whether an engineer
is a managing agent of a corporation is the Duncan decision 20
15. See Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Ry., 159 S.E.2d 243, 246 (S.C.
1968).
16. E.g., Proseus v. Anchor Lines, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
United States v. The Dorothy McAllister, 24 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Rubin v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Garshol
v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 12 F.R.D. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); State ex rel. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Duncan, 230 Ore. 179, 368 P.2d 733 (1962).
17. Since Rule 26(d) permits an adverse party to use the deposition of a
director of the corporation, it would appear that the corporation could be
examined through an officer, managing agent or director. However, Rule 37
penalizes the corporation only when an officer or managing agent refuses to
attend an examination. The courts have concluded that a corporation may not
be compelled to produce a director as such for examination. See, Note, Dis-
covery again.t Corporations under the Federal Riles, 47 IowA L. REV. 1006
(1962).
18. United States v. The Dorothy McAllister, 24 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
19. See cases cited, supra note 16.
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which arose under a state statutory counterpart to the Federal
Rules.21 This decision held that since the engineer had no
general supervisory powers, no general authority to bind the
company in any manner, and could take positions contrary to
those believed by the corporation to be in its best interest, he
was not a managing agent of the corporation. Had the South
Carolina court accepted this analogy to the Federal Rules and
similar state statutes, the examination of Morris would have
fallen squarely within the Dunean decision.
One other aspect of the case must be briefly commented
upon. The defendant contended that it should not be required
to beax the financial burden of producing the engineer for exam-
ination. Section 26-503 of the South Carolina Code makes no
mention of who must bear the expense of the examination.
Moreover, the court recognized that no case dealt precisely with
this point. Since the original time for examination had passed
and in view of the plaintiff's willingness to examine Morris in
Atlanta at his convenience, the court declined to decide this
question.
The significance of Lewis is that it permits wide latitude in
the pre-trial examination of a corporate party, and shows that
section 26-503 of the South Carolina Code is broader than rule
26(d) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the
Lewis interpretation of section 26-503, officers, agents and em-
ployees may be examined, while the Federal Rules allow only
officers and managing agents to be questioned. Furthermore,
this decision may not limit the examination to situations in
which the corporate employee has the sole knowledge of the
circumstances under inquiry.
R. DAViS HoWsFER
21. ORE. REV. STAT. § 45.190 provides in part:
If a party, or an officer or managing agent of a party, wilfully fails to
appear before the officer who is to take his deposition after being served
with a proper notice, the court in which the action, suit or proceeding
is pending, on motion and notice, may, within the limitations required by
due process, strike all or any part of any pleading of that party or dis-
miss the action or proceeding or any part thereof. ...
[Vol. 20
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Search Warrants-Citizens have a
constitutional right to require administrative officials to pro-
duce a search warrant prior to inspecting a private dwelling or
proviate commercial property. Camara v. San Francisco (Sup.
Ct. 1967); See v. Seattle (Sup. Ct. 1967.)
The defendant, lessee of an apartment, refused to permit a
warrantless health inspection of his premises in violation of a
city housing code. Defendant sought a writ prohibiting his
prosecution in a California municipal court, but the writ was
denied by the superior court. This decision was affirmed by
the district court of appeals, and petition for hearing was de-
nied by the state supreme court. The United States Supreme
Court, held, judgment vacated and case remanded. The United
States Constitution through the fourth amendment protects in-
dividuals from such administrative searches when conducted
without a search warrant even though such searches were au-
thorized. Camara v. San Franeisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
In a similar case decided on the same day, the Court applied
the same constitutional protection to the owner of a warehouse
who refused to submit to a fire inspection. On appeal the Su-
preme Court, held, reversed. In order to conform to constitu-
tional requirements, administrative searches of commercial prem-
ises must be conducted within the framework of a warrant
procedure. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
The Camara decision expressly overruled Frank v. Maryland'
in which a five-to-four majority had permitted a warrantless
inspection of a private dwelling for the purpose of locating and
abating a suspected public nuisance. The Frank decision was
seen by the Court in Eaton 'v. Price2 as creating another excep-
tion to the fourth amendment's prohibition against warrantless
inspections.
Search warrants have always been required except when the
search was incident to a lawful arrest or when certain "excep-
tional circumstances" existed.8 Prior to Frank these "excep-
tional circumstances" were limited to situations in which evi-
dence was in danger of immediate destruction4 or was contained
in a vehicle which was capable of being moved. 5 Although this
1. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
3. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
5. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
1968]
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protection of the fourth amendment has not been limited to
searches of the home, the Court has always felt that "privacy
in the home" is a somewhat sacred right. This feeling was
displayed by the Court's statement in Agnello v. United States7
that "[tlhe search of a private dwelling without a warrant is
in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." It is this
right to privacy against arbitrary intrusion that is the core of
the fourth amendment and basic to a free society.8
The protection of the fourth amendment has always been
thought to extend to civil litigation as well as criminal prosecu-
tion, when the right of privacy of the individual is being threat-
ened by governmental agents ;9 however, the majority in Frank
had refused to apply the fourth amendment to situations involv-
ing house inspections because there was no search for evidence to
be used in criminal prosecution. Yet Camara refused to accept
this distinction as a sufficient reason to justify a weakening of
the fourth amendment's protection. This decision seems sound
especially in view of the fact that in some states the health in-
spectors are none other than the police themselves,' ° and in
some cities violation of an ordinance may lead to criminal prose-
cution." In the instant case refusal to permit an inspection was
a crime in itself.
The Court decided that the resident could require a warrant
prior to any inspection. Consequently, there must be "probable
cause" to issue such a warrant. In arriving at this conclusion the
Court overturned numerous lower court decisions that held
warrantless inspections were valid.12 Such routine inspections
were deemed necessary to the public health and welfare.' 3 The
Court further declared that "the facts that would justify an
inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly
different from those that would justify an inference where a
criminal investigation has been undertaken."1 4  Whether the
necessary probable cause exists would be determined by legis-
6. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), in which the Court held
that a search of defendant's hotel room was illegal even though consent had
been given by the hotel clerk.
7. 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
8. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
9. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1959) (dissent).
10. Id. at 367 (1959).
11. E.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 026-8.0 (1964).
12. Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535 n.11 (1967).
13. Id. at 535 n.12.
14. Id. at 538.
[Vol. 20
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lative or administrative standards, i.e., "passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house),
or the condition of the entire area."15 Thus the issuance of in-
spection warrants would not depend on knowledge about the
particular dwelling in question nor would warrants be required
at all unless permission to inspect was refused.
In See v. Seattle'16 the Court determined that administrative
inspections of private commercial property were also subject
to the protections of the fourth amendment. See extends fourth
amendment protection one step further so that the individual
is now protected against unreasonable official intrusion in his
private business as well as in his home. In both Camara and See
there has been a fulfillment of the historic purpose of the fourth
amendment's protection against unreasonable governmental in-
tervention. The public interest must be weighed against the
rights of the individual and if that interest is great enough
then the right to privacy must yield.
Several questions presented by the Camara and See decisions
still remain unanswered. Will this dual standard for deter-
mining probable cause result in an overlapping of the two and
thus result in a watering down of the test used in the criminal
area or possibly result in a stiffening of the requirements for
obtaining warrants for health and safety inspections? And,
even though the warrants need be obtained only upon request,
will an intolerable burden be placed upon magistrates and ad-
ministrative officials by an increased number of citizens re-
quiring such warrants? "One rebel a year ... is not too great
a price to pay for maintaining our guarantee of civil rights




16. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
17. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 (1959).
1968]
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Right to Counsel-An indigent de-
fendant charged with a misdemeanor and faced with possible
incarceration is entitled to assigned counsel. State v. Borst
(Minn. 1967).
The defendant, an alleged indigent, was charged with the
misdemeanor of knowing publication of a false statement con-
cerning a candidate in a coming election. His request for ap-
pointed counsel was denied by the municipal court which found
him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of one hundred
dollars or to serve thirty days in the county jail. The defendant
appealed his conviction to the district court and applied for ap-
pointment of counsel. His application was denied, and the
defendant petitioned the supreme court for an alternative writ
of mandamus commanding the district court to appoint counsel.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, relying on its supervisory pow-
ers to insure the fair administration of justice, held, that when
conviction of the crime charged may lead to incarceration, the
defendant who is unable to provide counsel for himself is en-
titled to have counsel appointed by the court. State v. Borst,
154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically ad-
dressed itself to the question of whether the indigent misde-
meanant is constitutionally entitled to assigned counsel. In
Gideon v. Vainwright' the Court stated that the sixth amend-
ment's right to have assistance of counsel in a criminal prose-
cution was applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth
amendment and required the appointment of trial counsel for
an indigent defendant charged with a non-capital felony. Since
that time several courts have interpreted Gideon as requiring
the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases2 while others
have reached the opposite result.3 Some courts have permitted
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. State,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Rutledge v. City of Miami, 267 F. Supp. 885
(S.D. Fla. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966);
Petition of Thomas, 261 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. La. 1966); Irvin v. State, 203
So. 2d 283 (Ala. App. 1967); State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784
(1964); Patterson v. State 227 Md. 194, 175 A2d 746 (1961) ; vacated and re-
nManded per curiam, Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963) ; rev'd on re-
mand per curialn, Patterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
3. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 907 (1966) ; Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964); State v. Thomas,
249 La. 742, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966) ; see Creighton v. State, 257 F. Supp. 806
(E.D.N.C. 1966) ; State v. Dejoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966) ; State v. Sherron, 268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E,2d
599 (1966) ; State v. Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 147 S.E.2d 237 (1966) ; Pizzitola
v. State, 374 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. 1964).
[Vol. 2.0
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the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases as a require-
ment of the state constitution, 4 statute5 or local case law.6
Of those courts which have expanded the Gdeon rule, most
seem reluctant to extend the right of counsel to petty offenses,
7
and some have adhered to a serious offense rule.8 The problem
is one of idealistic theory versus practical consideration. "Some-
where between the extremes of a parking ticket and a capital
offense, a line must be drawn concerning the right to counsel."9
It is clear from the cases that there is no unanimity on where
to draw the line.
By drawing the line at incarceration State v. Borst10 seem-
ingly went further than any previous case in extending the right
to counsel." Under the Borst decision the state is required to
supply the indigent defendant with assigned counsel in any
case in which conviction may lead to a jail sentence or im-
prisonment for failure to pay a fine. Thus conceivably, assigned
counsel may be required in prosecutions for certain minor traf-
fic offenses' 2-an extension of the right to counsel which other
courts reject.' 3 The court specifically reserved "the question of
whether counsel must be furnished where only a fine is to be
4. In re Smiley, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179 (1967) ; Bolkovac v. State.
229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951); Hunter v. State 288 P.2d 425 (Okla.
Crim. 1955).
5. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 207 N.E.2d 358
(1965); City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777
(1967); see Comment, The Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants in State
Courts, 20 Apx. L. Rxv. 156 (1966).
6. See People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 207 N.E2d
358, (1965). -:44
7. People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 213 N.E.2d 670
(1967) (traffic offense) ; Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966)
(dictum); see McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) (dictum);
Brinson v. State, 269 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (dictum); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A. (b) (1964).
8. State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P2d 784 (1964); see Creighton v.
State, 257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
9. Brinson v. State, 269 F Supp. 747, 749 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
10. 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
11. But see the case of People v. Manikas, 230 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ill. 1967)
(dictum), in which the court, in reversing a misdemeanor conviction because
the defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have
assistance of counsel, said "[ifn all criminal cases where the penalty for the
offense imposes confinement, the court must advise the defendant that he has
a right to have counsel present before proceeding with the case."
12. State v. Borst, 154 N.W2d 888, 896-97 (Minn. 1967) (concurring
opinion).
13. People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 213 N.E.2d 670
(1965); see Brinson v. State, 269 F. Supp. 747, 748-49 (S.D. Fla. 1967)
(dictum); State v. McCrowe, 158 S.E2d 337 (N.C. 1968).
1968]
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imposed,"'14 but, as noted above, stated that if "the defendant
[is to be] incarcerated for failure to pay a fine, the rule laid
down in this case will apply."'
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States declined to
review three state court decisions involving the right to as-
signed counsel in misdemeanor cases.' The Supreme Court's
reluctance to clarify the Gideon rule prompted the Minnesota
Supreme Court to base its decision exclusively on its supervisory
power. The court said:
Until we have a definitive decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States as to whether Gideon requires appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent charged with a misdemeanor
as defined by our laws, as a Sixth Amendment right, we
choose not to guess at what it may eventually hold by basing
our decision on the Federal Constitution or even on our
state Constitution. In the exercise of our supervisory power
to insure the fair administration of justice, we decide that
counsel should be provided in any case, whether it be a
misdemeanor or not, which may lead to incarceration in a
penal institution.17
In the final analysis the Minnesota Supreme Court rendered
a broad decision which seemingly went beyond any previous de-
cision.18 The court believed the right to have assistance of coun-
sel to be fundamental to a fair trial and refused to have this
right depend on the classification of the crime charged.' 9 The
court also rejected the petty offense distinction followed by
some jurisdictions20 saying that any deprivation of liberty is
serious enough to require the appointment of counsel for a
defendant financially unable to supply his own.21  te . Borst
represents a significant extension of the right to counsel; how-
ever, it must be remembered that "[w]e deal here with a rule
of court which, although having constitutional overtones, is
based neither on constitution nor statute. 22
MANTON M. GIm
14. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967).
15. Id., 154 N.W.2d at 894.
16. DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1967); Cortinez v. Flournoy,
385 U.S. 925 (1967); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1967).
17. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967).
18. But see note 11 supra.
19. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. 1967).
20. Cases cited note 7 supra.
21. State v. Borst, 154 N.W2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967).
22. Id. 154 N.W.2d at 897 (concurring opinion)
[Vol. 20
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Search and Seizure - The fourth
amendment requires antecedent judicial authorization as a pre-
condition to electronic evasdropping of a conversation made from
a public telephone booth. Katz v. United States (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed the
petitioner placing telephone calls from the same bank of public
telephone booths during certain regular hours on an almost daily
basis. The agents had strong reason to believe the calls were
being placed for the purpose of transmitting wagering informa-
tion over interstate communications in violation of federal law.'
The F.B.I. agents placed electronic surveillance apparatus to-
gether with recording equipment outside the booths. No physical
penetration of the booths occurred nor did the agents tap the
telephone lines. A recording of the petitioner's conversation was
thus obtained and was admitted into evidence over the petition-
er's objections. Ultimately, the petitioner was convicted. On
appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction on the grounds that the fourth amendment search and
seizure provisions had not been violated in that no physical
penetration had been made into a constitutionally protected
area.2 The Supreme Court, held, reversed. The Court determined
that under the circumstances in the case the fourth amendment
protected the conversation, and antecedent judicial authorization
was a constitutional precondition for eavesdropping irrespective
of the fact that no physical penetration of the booth had oc-
curred. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
The fourth amendment guarantees the right of the people to
be protected in "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures3 and any evidence seized in vio-
lation of this amendment will be inadmissible against an ac-
cused whether seized by federal or state authorities. 4 Because the
list of things mentioned in the fourth amendment includes only
things of a physical nature, it was thought at one time that only
tangible items were protected. This rationale led the Court to
hold in Olmetead v. United States5 that a telephone conversa-
tion overheard by the use of wiretapping fell outside the ambit
of the fourth amendment since no trespass occurred and no
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964).
2. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
3. U. S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
4. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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material objects were seized. In Godmn v. United States the
Court squarely held that eavesdropping-as distinguished from
wiretapping-was not within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment. In this case law enforcement officers placed a detecta-
phone against an adjoining wall and listened to the conversations
of the defendant in his private office. The conversation itself
was not protected, and since no "trespass" occurred, there was
no violation of the fourth amendment.
As technological developments improved the efficiency of
electronic eavesdropping devices, it became increasingly diffi-
cult to protect an area from surveillance. As this menace to in-
dividual privacy increased, judicial sensitivity to the problem
developed. Sitverm n v. United Stated7 reflected the growing
judicial disapproval of eavesdropping. In Silvernwn law en-
forcement officers placed a "spiked mike" into a common wall
between them and the defendant's home. As a result the defen-
dant's heating system was converted into a gigantic microphone.
The Court decided this constituted an unauthorized physical
penetration into a constitutionally protected area, and therefore,
the conversation "seized" was taken in violation of the Constitu-
tion. Consequently, conversations were brought within the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment, but only when there was an
incidental physical "trespass." The unrealistic nature of this
requirement is best illustrated by CMinton v. VTirginia8 in which
evidence acquired by eavesdropping was excluded because a
penetration to the depth of a thumbtack into an adjoining wall
had occurred.
Law enforcement officers relied on Ometead and GoZdman
as allowing eavesdropping so long as no physical penetration,
which could be construed as a "trespass," took place. The tres-
pass doctrine was severely criticized as an inadequate standard
for determining the constitutionality of electronic eavesdrop-
ping.0
The significant aspect of the instant case is that it rejects the
trespass doctrine which solved fourth amendment problems on
the basis of the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area. Olmnstead and Goldmam "can
6. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
7. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
8. 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
9. E.g., Note, The Constitutionality of Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L.
REv. 835, 841-46 (1966).
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no longer be regarded as controlling."' 0 The fact that the con-
versation in question was made from a public telephone booth
rather than the defendant's private phone was not important
because.
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.... But, what he seeks to preserve as private even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.:"
When the defendant closed the doors of the booth behind him,
he meant for his conversation to be private. For this reason
alone the conversation comes within the purview of the fourth
amendment.
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people--and not simply "areas"--against unreasonable
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion .... The fact that the electronic device
employed . . . did not happen to penetrate the wall of
the booth can have no constitutional significance.' 2
Thus, when the requirement of a constitutionally protected area
concept was rejected, the major premise of Olmnstead and Gold-
man, the physical "trespass" test becomes irrelevant.
G7iswold v. Conmeticut13 established the existence of a con-
stitutionally protected "right to privacy." Prior to Katz, it was
urged by writers that this right to privacy be expanded to pro-
tect the individual from electronic eavesdropping.14 However,
the Court in Katz decided not to expand the right to privacy,
but instead based its decision solely on the fourth amendment
which the Court said could not "be translated into a general right
to privacy."' 5
Having decided that electronic eavesdropping was within the
scope of the fourth amendment's protection, the Court then held
10. Katz v. United States, 88 S.Ct 507, 512 (1967).
11. Id. at 511.
12. Id. at 512.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9.
15. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507, 510 (1967).
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that under the circumstances in this case antecedent judicial au-
thorization was a constitutional precondition for the use of
eavesdropping. To hold otherwise would leave the protection
of the fourth amendment rights to the discretion of the police
-whom the Court has previously characterized as poor guard-
ians of constitutional rights. The Court had previously upheld
in Osborn v. United States1 6 the validity of judicially authorized
electronic surveillance under sufficiently "precise and discrimi-
nate circumstances [when used] for the narrow and particu-
larized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the... allegations
[of a] detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a
specific criminal offense .... 1 The order authorizing elec-
tronic eavesdropping will have to meet the same standards and
give the same protections as do warrants for conventional
searches and seizures. To obtain such a warrant, law enforce-
ment officers must appear before an impartial judicial officer
and present their estimate of probable cause. To establish prob-
able cause sufficient for the authorization they must indicate
that a crime has been committed, the need for the eavesdropping
investigation and a detailed description of what the search is
to entail. As pointed out by Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion, fulfilling the requirement of describing the thing to
be seized might prove very difficult since the conversation has
not yet taken place. By an advance order the judicial officer
would precisely limit the scope of the eavesdropping, and after
the completion of the eavesdropping, the officers would be re-
quired to notify the judicial officer of all that was seized. The
Court said such authorization would have clearly been available
in the instant case, but the fruits of the surveillance were in-
admissible notwithstanding the presence of probable cause be-
cause "searches conducted.., without prior approval by judge
or magistrate are per se unreasonable . . ."'18-subject to few
exceptions within which it is difficult to imagine any eavesdrop-
ping situation falling.
Justice Black dissented on the grounds that electronic eaves-
dropping did not constitute a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. He pointed out that eaves-
dropping was an ancient practice known at common law.19 The
16. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
17. Id. at 329-30.
18. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct 507, 514 (1967).
19. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMXENTARIES 168.
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Framers of the Constitution were aware of this practice and
had they wanted to prohibit it they would have done so specifi-
cally. Furthermore, Black feels the amendment was intended by
the Framers to be limited to tangible items because it speaks of
describing things or persons to be seized. He further points out
that conversations are by their nature non-existent until made
and, therefore, impossible to describe accurately to a magistrate.
In short, Black feels the majority is doing nothing less than
rewriting the fourth amendment.
The most important question left unanswered is whether the
standards delineated in this opinion will apply to cases involv-
ing national security. The majority opinion left it unanswered
saying: "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by
a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation
involving national security is a question not presented by this
case."'20 Justice White, in a concurring opinion, urged the al-
lowance of electronic surveillance without a warrant if the Presi-
dent or Attorney General has deemed it necessary because of
national security. Douglas, joined by Brennan, attacks White's
opinion saying: "[s]pies and saboteurs are as entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like
the petitioner....,,21
Now, for the first time, eavesdropping per se is within the
protection of the fourth amendment. At least with respect to
crimes not related to national security, electronic eavesdropping
may only be carried out under prior judicial authorization when
the requirements for a conventional warrant are met-this will
likely prove to be a very strict standard.
_ENRY B. RIoHAmDSON, JR.
20. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507, 515 n.23 (1967).
21. Id. at 516.
1968]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss2/8
SOUTH CARoLinA LAw REvmw
EVIJDENCE - Counsel's Impeachment of His Own Witness -
In order for counsel to impeach his own witness, there must have
been prejudicial testimony given by the witness in addition to
the element of surprise, and mere surprise at his failure to re-
spond helpfully as anticipated is not grounds for impeachment.
S tate v. Richburg (S.C. 1968).
The appellant in a second trial (the first having resulted in
a mistrial) was convicted of the murder of an Orangeburg
County Deputy Sheriff. The state contended that the deputy
was making a lawful arrest for a traffic violation committed in
his presence. The state further alleged that Richburg refused to
co-operate, procured a pistol from his home nearby, and re-
turned to maliciously kill the deputy. Richburg contended that
he first offered to co-operate, but was forced to shoot the deputy
in self-defense after being subjected to force unnecessary to pro-
cure his arrest. At trial the state called as a witness T. L. John-
son who had been called by neither party at the first trial.
Johnson had allegedly given a written statement concerning the
incident. Upon the stand he denied all pertinent knowledge of
the shooting, and the solicitor claimed surprise. Testimony was
taken in the jury's absence, and Johnson was declared a hostile
witness. When the jury returned, the solicitor cross-examined
Johnson, his own witness, by reading to him the statement which
he allegedly had made. Johnson denied having made all or sub-
stantially all of the statement, but at the same time he admitted
having signed it. The state produced witnesses to testify to
the voluntariness of the statement and to Johnson's apparent
understanding of it at that time. The state's attempt to impeach
its own witness was objected to by Richburg's counsel. On appeal
the South Carolina Supreme Court, hed, reversed and remanded
for a new trial. The court found that for the state to impeach its
own witness, there must have been prejudicial testimony given
by him. Mere surprise at the failure of the witness to respond
favorably as anticipated is not grounds for such impeachment.
State v. Richburg, 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1968).
The origin of the rule against counsel impeaching his own
witness is somewhat uncertain, although it is believed to have
had its growth from the ancient concept of trial by compurgation
(oath-taking).' In any event the rule was well established by
the end of the 1700's. In South Carolina in 1828 the court stated
1. 3 J. WIcuon, EvrDENcF § 896 (3d ed. 1940).
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that counsel would not be allowed to impeach his own witness
by showing that his character was bad but could offer testimony
of other witnesses to show that the witness was mistaken in
regard to his ultimate statement.2 Shortly thereafter, in Farr v.
Thompson,3 the court's analysis of the rule was that not only
was general evidence impugning the character of the witness
excluded but so were prior inconsistent statements. As an ex-
ception to this rule, the court felt that such general evidence
and inconsistent statements were admissible to the extent of
showing that the witness was in error. Such evidence and
statements were admitted only as to the impeachment of the
credibility of the witness and were not to be considered for their
substantive value. Later it was recognized that counsel could
impeach his own witness if the witness was not of his own choos-
ing, but one whom the law obliged him to call. 4 Further varia-
tion was allowed when it was held that it was within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge to allow counsel to interrogate his own
witness if surprise were shown.5 In addition to the surprise factor
the element of hostility as a basis for allowing cross-examination
and impeachment of counsel's own witness was included within
the trial judge's discretion.6 The only limitation of the discre-
tionary power of the judge to allow impeachment of the witness
is that counsel must have been taken by surprise and must have
made a request to cross-examine.7 The court in State v. NeZson
8
stated the rule as it had been developed prior to Richburg:
[T]he general rule that a party cannot directly impeach or
discredit his own witness is subject to the exception that
when a witness proves hostile or recalcitrant, the party
calling him may probe his conscience or test his recollection
to the end that the whole truth may be laid bare; and the
extent to which this may be done depends upon judicial
discretion exercised in the light of the circumstances in
which the question arises .... The cases generally hold for
a party to be able to impeach his own witness on the ground
2. Perry v. Massey, 1 Bail. L. 32 (S.C. 1828).
3. Cheves 37 (S.C. 1839).
4. Jerkowski v. Marco, 57 S.C. 402, 35 S.E. 750 (1900) (witness to a
mortgage).
5. State v. Waldrop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905).
6. State v. Trull, 232 S.C. 250, 101 S.E.2d 648 (1958); State v. McKay, 89
S.C. 243, 71 S.E. 858 (1911).
7. Scott v. International Agr. Corp., 180 S.C. 1, 184 S.E. 133 (1936).
8. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940).
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of surprise or entrapment, it is essential that it appear that
the party has been actually surprised by the testimony of
such witness, or that he has been deceived or entrapped into
introducing the witness because of such contradictory state-
ments .... 0
With this pronouncement the court clarified its position in
regard to the application of the basic rule of not allowing coun-
sel to impeach his own witness. With the evolution of the hostile
witness and surprise exceptions the court afforded some pro-
tection for the unwary counselor who had been betrayed. 10 Hicks
v. Colemn-in reaffirmed the rule enunciated in Nelson, and in
State v. Russ12 the court stated that it was always permissible
for a surprised party to ask his own witness whether he had made
prior statements inconsistent with his present testimony.
The Richburg court modified the Nelson rule to the extent
that:
Where the testimony of a witness is not prejudicial to the
party calling him, the credibility of the witness is immaterial
and no reason exists for impeaching him. It is not suf-
ficient that the witness merely fails to testify to a material
fact, fails to give testimony favorable to the party producing
him, gives no testimony adverse to him, gives irrelevant
testimony, or denies that he has any knowledge of the
matter involved . .. In a criminal prosecution, the at-
torney for the state may not examine a witness for the
prosecution as to prior inconsistent statements where such
witness gives no testimony prejudicial to the state, as where
he merely denies knowledge of the facts.' s
In general the experts advocate the abolition of the rule against
counsel impeaching his own witness. Wigmore states: "There
is no substantial reason for preserving the rule,--the remnant
of a primitive notion .... 1-14 McCormick believes that the rule
against showing prior inconsistent statements of counselor's wit-
9. Id. at 426, 7 S.E.2d at 74.
10. See J. DnmsEs, A GUIDE To EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA at
15 (1967).
11. 240 S.C. 227, 125 S.E.2d 473 (1962).
12. 208 S.C. 449, 38 S.E.2d 385 (1946). The court also stated that the basic
rule of not allowing a party to impeach his own witness generally pertains
to both civil and criminal cases.
13. State v. Richburg, 158 S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (S.C. 1968).
14. 3 3. WIGuORE, EvIDENcE § 899 (3d ed. 1940).
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ness militates against a true evaluation of his testimony and thus
constitutes a "serious obstruction to the ascertainment of truth."' 5
Rule 20 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence also advocates its
abandonment.
The additional requirement of showing prejudice as imposed
by Rickhnurg places an extra burden upon the trial lawyer in
that he is further placed in a rather precarious position. He
finds himself possibly subjected to the whims of an unscrupulous
witness who through a mere change of mind may suppress the
truth from the consideration of the jury.1 This possibility
existed under the law prior to Richburg and still seems to be a
distinct possibility today.
LEwms S. HORTON
15. C. McCoPwcIx, EvDENcE § 38 (1954).
16. See J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SouTH CAROLINA at 15
(1967). The basic dangers of abuse that existed prior to Richburg still exist
in that if an attorney is given written notice that the witness repudiates his
testimony then the attorney cannot impeach him. State v. Nelson, 192 S.C.
422, 7 SE2d 72 (1939). Also, the rule may not be waived by the adverse
party even if the party consents. Farr v. Thompson, Cheves 37 (S.C. 1839).
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INSURANCE - Duty of Insurer to Settle - Liability insurer
which refuses to settle claim against insured within policy limits
on having opportunity to do so, without performing its duty to
insured of arriving at informed judgment in good faith after
reasonably diligent investigation, is liable to insured for amount
judgment exceeds policy limits. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Iwu'ance Co. v. White (Md. 1967).
White, who was insured by State Farm against liability to the
extent of $10,000, was involved in an automobile collision with
Savage. Mills, a passenger in White's car, sued both drivers,
claiming damages of $30,000. White relied on the insurer's
counsel to defend, and counsel expressed hope for a favorable
verdict on the issue of White's negligence. Before the trial, Mills'
attorney made a series of offers to the State Farm adjuster, at-
tempting to settle for $15,000, then $12,500 and finally $10,000.
The insurer refused to pay more than $6,250 for a release. The
trial court verdict of $17,495 was affirmed by the court of
appeals with respect to White, though reversed as to Savage.'
White then brought suit against State Farm, alleging both
negligence and bad faith in refusing to settle. A jury returned a
verdict for White, and judgment was entered for the full amount
of the excess over the policy limits. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, held, affirmed. For an insurer to measure
up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must
consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence,
and the insurer's negligence is relevant in determining whether
it acted in good faith. There was evidence from which the jury
could have concluded that the insurer's investigation was insuf-
ficient for trial purposes and that the insurer should have
recognized the risk involved in the litigation. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 236 A.2d 269 (Md.
1967).
That a liability insurer is liable for an excess judgment if it
fails to exercise good faith in considering offers to compromise
the claim for an amount within the policy limits is a well-estab-
lished rule of insurance law. 2 Although the White decision is
the first application of the rule in Maryland, a more important
aspect of the case is its treatment of the relationship between
good faith and negligence in determining the insurer's liability.
1. Savage v. Mills, 237 Md. 204, 205 A2d 239 (1964).
2. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955); accord, 45 CJ.S. Insurance § 936
(1946), 7 An!. JuR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 156 (1963).
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In considering the question of whether the insurer may be
held liable for bad faith, negligence, or a combination of both
in failing to settle, the courts have divided into three groups
and have generally followed one of these rules: (1) The insurer's
duty is limited to the exercise of good faith, and there is no
liability for mere negligence; (2) The insurer's negligence is a
relevant consideration in determining the existence of good
faith; or (3) The insurer's liability may rest upon negligence as
well as lack of good faith, thereby rejecting the contention that
the duty is limited to the exercise of good faith alone.
3
Thus the Maryland court, in considering White, was forced
to determine into which of these three rings it would toss its
precedent-establishing hat. The court's reasoning is valuable
in showing the relative merits of the "good faith" and "negli-
gence" tests and in illustrating the most recent trend of the law
in this area.
The court was aided in its choice by two recent decisions. In
Sweeten v. Nationau MutuaZ Insurance Co.4 the Maryland Court
of Appeals held that a declaration alleging negligence and bad
faith stated a cause of action for breach of the insurer's duty to
settle and reversed the trial court's sustainment of the demurrer
to the complaint. However, the court expressed its belief that
"[the prevailing view appears to be that recovery should be
rested on the theory of bad faith.. ." and acknowledged the areas
of dispute among the jurisdictions.5
The issue was heard on the merits in Gaskill v. Prefered Risk
Mutual Insu 'anwe Co.,6 a federal diversity action in which
Maryland law was applicable. The holding in this case was
largely adopted by the state court in White. The district court
stated:
It seems clear that the duty includes elements both of good
faith and of reasonable care. This court concludes that the
proper test of liability . . . (and the test which this court
believes the Maryland court will probably apply when re-
quired to decide the question) is the good faith test, with
3. Annot, 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955) ; 7 Am. Jtm. 2d Automobile Insurance
§ 156 (1963). Both authorities list particular state jurisdictions for each
category.
4. 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963).
5. Id., 194 A.2d at 818.
6. 251 F. Supp. 66 (D. Md. 1966).
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[certain] amplifications and limitations [which are due
care qualifications of the good faith test] .... 7
The Gaskill holding was adopted by the Maryland court in
'White, as the district court had prophesied. Judge Finan in
White favorably compared the trial court's charge to the jury
to the Gaskill theory and concluded:
[W]e are persuaded that for an insurer to measure up to
the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must
consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and dili-
gence. Furthermore, the insurer's negligence, if any there
be, is relevant in determining whether or not it acted in
good faith.3
Thus Maryland chose to number itself among the second group
by adopting the good faith test qualified by relevant negligence.
The South Carolina cases, though reasoned similarly to the
Maryland decisions, seem to fall in the third category which
allows recovery on proof of either negligence or bad faith. The
state's position was firmly established in the 1930's by the
famous Tyger River cases0 and has remained virtually un-
changed.
In the first Tyger River case the defendant insurer appealed
from a trial court order overruling its demurrer to the com-
plaint which alleged both negligence and bad faith on the part
of the insurer. The court decided that the allegations were suf-
ficient to state a cause of action "either in contract or in tort
for breach of contract, or of bad faith or negligence in the
performance of contract" 10 without distinguishing between the
causes or favoring one over the other.
After the supreme court sustained the plaintiff's complaint,
the litigation returned to the trial court, where Tyger River Pine
Co. obtained a verdict. Maryland Casualty again appealed,
specifically contending that the plaintiff could not recover for
negligence unaccompanied by fraud or bad faith. The court
7. rd. at 68.
8. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 236 A.2d 269, 273 (Md. 1967).
9. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933); Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 163 S.C. 229, 161
S.E. 491 (1931). Both cases involve the same litigation, and the misspelling
of the plaintiff company's name in the earlier case has been retained uncorrect-
ed through subsequent citations.
10. Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 163 S.C. 229, 232, 161
S.E. 491, 492 (1931).
[Vol. 20
23
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
RECENT DECISIONS
ruled that the question had been decided when defendant's de-
murrer was overruled in the previous appeal. Thereupon, the
court found that the prevailing opinion, to which South Carolina
would adhere, was that a cause of action could properly be
maintained for breach of an implied contract or in tort for
negligence. The court further stated that the insurer in nego-
tiating a settlement was bound "to sacrifice its interests in favor
of those of the respondent,"" and that to hold otherwise would
place the insurer in the commanding position of being able to
tell the insured, "Heads I win, tails you lose."-
2
The plaintiff's complaint in the Tyger River litigation al-
leged fraud, bad faith and negligence, and the courts thereafter
have held the insurer's liability is established upon the proof of
either of the three elements. Yet though the grounds of the
insurer's liability are broad, it does not appear from the cases
that an injustice has been imposed upon insurance companies.
In fact, if optimistic insured's attorneys had believed that the
Tyger River holdings legally entitled them to force the insurer
to settle within the policy limits, the federal district court of
South Carolina quashed their notion in Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v.
American Fidelity & Casualty C&.13 The court, upon the in-
surer's motion for a directed verdict, considered the effect of
the Tyger River cases and awarded judgment for the insurer,
saying that any other result under these facts would "make a
demand upon the indemnity company to settle within the
indemnification limit on the ground that it was legally entitled
to do so under the South Carolina law . . . . "1 In Amerian
Casualty Co. v. Howard,15 which was quoted in Gaskil and
subsequently in White, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
in an action for declaratory judgment that the insurer, though
obligated to defend, was not required to repay its insured when
the insured had paid in excess of the policy after the insurer had
refused to settle the claim for a requested amount. The court
reasoned that the "[i]nsured can readily secure all needed pro-
tection by purchasing, and paying for, a policy with a high limit
of liability on the insurer."16
11. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170
S.E. 346, 348 (1933).
12. Id. at 293, 170 S.E. at 348.
13. 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
14. Id. at 810.
15. 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
16. Id. at 329.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court found for the insurer in
the unusual situation presented in Miles v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co&.17 In this case the insurer refused to
defend, relying on its insured's statement that the injured party
was a member of the household at the time of the accident and
was thus excluded by the policy terms. The court held that State
Farm was not guilty of negligence or bad faith in relying on
the statement and refusing to defend without further investiga-
tion and found for the insurer.
South Carolina district court cases have held that the plaintiff
was entitled to use the federal discovery rules to investigate the
insurer's possible negligence, recklessness and bad faith in not
settling,'8 and that, in the absence of a state ruling on the point,
a payment of an excess judgment by the insured was not a pre-
requisite to the insured's bringing suit.' 9
The latest South Carolina ruling involving the duty of the
insurer to settle should provide a formidable caveat for in-
surers to deal justly with their policy-holders. In the typical
fact situation represented by Andrews v. Central Surety Insur-
ance Co.,20 Andrews, insured by Central Surety for $10,000,
was at fault in an automobile accident in which another burned
to death. The deceased's estate sued for conscious pain and
suffering as well as wrongful death, but the estate's attorney
offered to settle with Central Surety for $9,950. The insurer
would offer no more than $9,850, and over this unbridgeable
$100 gap the parties went to court. The judgment was against
Andrews in excess of the policy limits, and he brought suit
against Central Surety on the usual grounds-negligence and
bad faith in refusing to settle. Said Judge Simons, "The court
17. 238 S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961). For a discussion of this case, see
Walker, 1962 Survey of South Carolina Law-Insurance, 15 S.C.L. REv.
116, 123. The insured's daughter-in-law had obtained a default judgment in
excess of the policy limits against the insured and then sued the insurer for
the policy limits. In the second action brought by the daughter-in-law, the
jury chose to disregard the insured's statement, found that the injured was
not a member of the insured's household, and rendered judgment against the
insurer. State Farm paid this verdict, but then the insured brought an action
against State Farm for alleged negligence and bad faith for not settling the
claim of the daughter-in-law. The trial court directed the verdict for the
insurer, and the insured appealed to the supreme court.
18. Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
19. Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
20. 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967). In addition to the Tyger River and
Chitty cases, the court in Andrews cited Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 184
F. Supp. 634 (D. Md. 1960) and Gaskill v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 251




et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
8RECENT DECISIONS
can only conclude that such irresponsible or selfish action on
the defendant's part amounted not only to negligence, but also
to bad faith,"21 and rendered judgment against Central Surety
for the total excess amount of the verdict-$13,000.
The White decision, a novel impression case, determined that
the prevailing view and the rule that represented the most rea-
sonable judgment, was that recovery should be based on the
theory of bad faith along with a consideration of any relevant
negligence. Though the South Carolina decisions seem to treat
the good faith and negligence tests equally, the cases from the
two jurisdictions illustrate little discrepancy in the final result.
As Professor Keeton has suggested, the distinction between the
"bad faith rule" and the "negligence rule" is less marked than
the terms suggest.22  White follows the more recent cases in
which the two tests have tended to coalesce,23 strengthening the
trend of disregarding the superficial aspects of the separate
causes of action in favor of an overall examination of how the
insurer fulfilled its obligations to its insured.
C-Lrsias E. Hnum
21. Id. at 821.
22. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 I .
L. REv. 1136 (1954).
23. 7 AM. Jup. 2d Automobile Insurance § 156 (1963).
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